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DIVISION OF LABOR: THE MODERNIZATION OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA AND 
CONCOMITANT WORKLOAD REDUCTION 
MEASURES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Kyle G.A. Wallace, Andrew J. Tuck, and Max Marks, 
Alston & Bird LLP* 
ABSTRACT 
This article addresses two distinct yet interrelated topics: the arcane 
and unnecessarily complex jurisdictional division between the Georgia 
Supreme Court and Georgia Court of Appeals, and the excessive 
caseload at the Georgia Court of Appeals. The topics relate to one 
another because, as will be seen, any attempt to clarify the 
jurisdictional division of labor between these courts, and convert the 
Supreme Court into more exclusively a court of last resort, will 
necessarily increase the caseload at the already-overworked Court of 
Appeals. Consequently, any amendment to appellate jurisdiction in 
Georgia requires concomitant measures to reduce the per judge 
caseload at the Court of Appeals. In Part I.A., this article discusses 
Georgia’s appellate system—its history, the jurisdictional division that 
arose, the confusion the current jurisdictional framework creates, and 
the limitations and burdens it places on Georgia’s highest court. In Part 
I.B., the article discusses the current caseload at the Court of Appeals 
and the burden any jurisdictional reforms would have on the Court of 
Appeals. In Part II, the article presents a new clear jurisdictional 
framework for the Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia Court of 
Appeals, and at the same time, offers cost-effective solutions to ease 
the burden at the Court of Appeals, so that these jurisdictional changes 
can be implemented. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 *  The authors are all attorneys at Alston & Bird, LLP, and members of its litigation and trial practice 
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I.   BACKGROUND 
A.   Georgia’s Appellate System 
1.   Brief History 
Georgia’s early history is marked by “apparent hostility . . . toward 
appellate courts in general.”1 For its first seventy years of existence, 
Georgia did not have any appellate courts at all, and Georgia’s courts 
have grown slowly since that time.2 In 1845, after extensive legislative 
debate about the unchecked power of superior court judges, the 
Supreme Court of Georgia was created and staffed with three Justices, 
making Georgia the last state then in existence to create an appellate 
court system.3 As the only appellate court in the state, the Supreme 
Court’s primary role was “the correction of errors in judgments 
rendered in the superior courts of this state.”4 Because the Supreme 
Court had jurisdiction over all appeals, as Georgia steadily grew, the 
court’s workload increased.5  By 1894, “the workload of the court 
became so heavy that Chief Justice Logan Bleckley 
resigned . . . because he was physically exhausted.”6 
The Georgia legislature addressed the Supreme Court’s overload in 
two ways. First, the legislature voted to expand the Supreme Court 
from three Justices to six in 1895 (the court would reach its current 
size of seven in 1945).7 Second, the legislature created a three member 
Court of Appeals in 1907 “[t]o further relieve the increasing workload 
of the Supreme Court.”8 As originally conceived, the Court of Appeals 
was “designated a court of final jurisdiction.”9 Though the Court of 
                                                                                                                 
 1. The Supreme Court of Georgia: A History, SUPREME COURT OF GA., http://www.gasupreme.us/ 
history/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
 2. See History of the Court of Appeals, GA. COURT OF APPEALS, http://www.gaappeals.us/history/ 
index.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Yesbik, 91 S.E. 873, 873 (Ga. 1917). 
 5. THOMAS S. CHAMBLESS ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE APPELLATE COURTS OF 
GEORGIA 2 (Dec. 1996) (on file with the Georgia Administrative Office of the Courts). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. History of the Court of Appeals, supra note 2. 
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Appeals could itself certify questions to the Supreme Court, the 
Supreme Court did not have certiorari jurisdiction.10 Consequently, the 
Supreme Court could not review any decisions of the Court of Appeals 
and could only decide cases that fell within the Court of Appeals’ 
direct appellate jurisdiction if the Court of Appeals asked for guidance 
by certifying a question to the Supreme Court. 11  For practical 
purposes, during this time the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 
were parallel courts of last resort depending on which court had 
jurisdiction over the appeal.12 
In 1916, the Georgia legislature doubled the size of the Court of 
Appeals to six, and Georgia’s Constitution was amended to 
redistribute jurisdiction between the Court of Appeals and Supreme 
Court in two ways.13 First, the direct appellate jurisdiction of each 
court was modified to be based on the subject matter of the case rather 
than the lower court from which the case was appealed.14 The subject 
matter-based jurisdictional division in the 1916 Constitution is 
essentially the same as the jurisdictional split under today’s 
Constitution.15 Second, the 1916 Constitution gave the Supreme Court 
certiorari jurisdiction over all cases within the Court of Appeals’ direct 
appellate jurisdiction, making the Supreme Court a true court of last 
resort sitting in review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, while at 
the same time retaining considerable direct review jurisdiction.16 
As Georgia continued to grow, the Court of Appeals—bearing a 
majority of the direct appeal jurisdiction with only six judges—began 
to experience strain.17 The Georgia legislature dealt with this problem 
primarily by increasing the number of judges.18 In the early 1960s, the 
Court of Appeals grew to seven in 1960 and then to nine in 1961.19 In 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5, at 2. 
 14. History of the Court of Appeals, supra note 2. 
 15. CHRISTOPHER J. MCFADDEN ET AL., GEORGIA APPELLATE PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 1:3, at 9 
(2012–2013 ed. 2013). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5, at 2. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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the late 1990s, the Court of Appeals expanded again, first growing to 
ten in 1996, then reaching its present size of twelve in 1999.20 This 
history of “intermittent increases in judgeships” on the Court of 
Appeals from its creation with three judges in 1907 to the increase to 
nine judges in 1961 roughly kept pace with Georgia’s population 
growth.21 As shown by the table below, Georgia’s population has more 
than doubled since 1961, yet the State has added only three judges to 
the Court of Appeals. 
 
Table 1—Population and Judges Over Time 
 
Date Ga. S.Ct. 
Justices 
Ga. 
App. 
Judges 
Total 
Appellate 
Judges 
Population* Population/ 
Appellate 
Judge 
1835 0 0 0 604,108 N/A 
1845 3 0 3 798,789 266,263 
1895 6 0 6 2,026,842 337,807 
1907 6 3 9 2,505,000 278,333 
1916 6 6 12 2,856,000 238,000 
1945 7 6 13 3,119,000 239,932 
1960 7 7 14 3,949,000 282,071 
1961 7 9 16 4,015,000 250,937 
1996 7 10 17 7,501,000 441,235 
1999 7 12 19 8,046,000 423,474 
2012 7 12 19 9,920,000 522,105 
* Population figures are approximate based on census data. For 
instance, the figure for 1895 is the average of 1890 and 1900 census 
data. Data for years after 1900—also based on census data—was 
pulled from https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=kf7tgg1 
uo9ude_&ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=populatio
n&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim=state:13000&ifdi
m=country&hl=en&dl=en&ind=false. 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Richard W. Creswell, Georgia Courts in the 21st Century: The Report of the Supreme Court of 
Georgia Blue Ribbon Commission on the Judiciary, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1, 11 (2001). 
 21. Id. 
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2.   Structure and Jurisdictional Division 
Under Georgia’s Constitution, the Supreme Court has a dual role. 
First, the Supreme Court retains its historical role as an error-
correcting court by exercising direct appellate jurisdiction over certain 
classes of cases.22 Second, the court has the familiar modern role as a 
court of last resort and carries the “ultimate responsibility for 
maintaining uniformity and coherence in [Georgia’s] legal doctrine.”23 
The court acts as a single body in presiding over its cases. The Georgia 
Constitution requires a majority of Justices present to hear each case.24 
While the maximum number of Justices is capped at nine by the 
Constitution, there has been no substantial push to increase the size of 
the Supreme Court beyond seven.25 
The Supreme Court’s direct appellate jurisdiction covers ten 
different subject areas. Under Article VI, Section 6, Paragraph 2 of the 
Georgia Constitution, the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over: “(1) All cases involving the construction of a treaty 
or of the Constitution of the State of Georgia or of the United States 
and all cases in which the constitutionality of a law, ordinance, or 
constitutional provision has been drawn in question; and (2) [a]ll cases 
of election contest.” 26  In addition, unless the Georgia legislature 
provides otherwise (and it has not), the Supreme Court has direct (or 
“general”) appellate jurisdiction over: 
(1) Cases involving title to land; (2) All equity cases; (3) All cases 
involving wills; (4) All habeas corpus cases; (5) All cases 
involving extraordinary remedies; (6) All divorce and alimony 
cases; (7) All cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals; and (8) 
All cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be 
imposed.27 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. at 13. 
 23. Id. 
 24. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at para. 2. 
 27. Id. at para. 3. 
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In addition to its areas of direct appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court “review[s] by certiorari cases [from] the Court of Appeals which 
are of gravity or great public importance.”28 Lastly, the Supreme Court 
has the “jurisdiction to answer any question of law from any state 
appellate or federal district or appellate court.”29 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over “all cases not reserved 
to the Supreme Court or conferred on other courts by law.”30 The Court 
of Appeals “sit[s] in panels of not less than three Judges.”31 If any 
judge on the three-judge panel dissents, the case must be decided by a 
seven-judge panel consisting of the panel to which the case was 
assigned, the next three-judge panel in line in rotation, and an 
additional seventh judge.32 The seven-judge panel does not hear oral 
argument, but may review the transcript of any argument that occurred 
before the original panel.33  There is no constitutional limit on the 
maximum number of judges who can serve on the Court of Appeals.34 
Unless the subject matter of a case is governed by Georgia’s 
discretionary appeals statute, both the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals must hear appeals of final judgments and other directly 
appealable rulings that fall within their respective subject matter 
jurisdictions.35 
Under Georgia’s discretionary appeal statute, O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35, 
the parties must apply for discretionary appellate review for certain 
classes of fact-intensive, routine, or low-stakes cases. 36  This 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at para. 5. 
 29. Id. at para. 4. The Supreme Court also has the jurisdiction to answer certified questions from the 
Court of Appeals. Id. at § 5, para. 4 (“The Court of Appeals may certify a question to the Supreme Court 
for instruction, to which it shall then be bound.”). 
 30. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 5, para. 3. 
 31. Id. at para. 2. 
 32. O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(c)(1) (2012). 
 33. § 15-3-1(c)(3). 
 34. See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 5, para. 1. 
 35. See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a) (2013). In addition to final judgments, O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a) lists several 
other rulings that are directly appealable as a matter of right, including: grants or denials of applications 
for interlocutory injunctions or final injunctions; mandamus or any other extraordinary remedy, except 
for temporary restraining orders; and judgments and orders sustaining the dismissal of a caveat to the 
probate of a will. All these examples would go directly to the Supreme Court by virtue of its jurisdiction 
over “[a]ll cases involving wills” and “[a]ll cases involving extraordinary remedies.” GA. CONST. art. VI, 
§ 6, para. 3(3), (5). 
 36. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (2012). 
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discretionary procedure was originally adopted by statute in 1979 “to 
ameliorate the appellate courts’ massive case loads[,]”37 serving as the 
major workload reform in the Georgia appellate courts between the 
1961 addition of three judges to the Court of Appeals (bringing the 
total from six to nine), and the increase of three additional judges in 
the late 1990s (bringing the court to its current twelve).38 O.C.G.A. 
§ 5-6-35 makes twelve categories of appeals discretionary including 
cases involving $10,000 or less, divorce, alimony, other domestic 
relations cases, denials of petitions for habeas corpus, grants or denials 
of temporary restraining orders, revocations of probation, grants or 
denials of petitions for release, terminations of parental rights, distress 
and dispossessory warrants involving only rent due of $2,500 or less, 
garnishments, and O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 attorneys’ fees awards. 39 
Additionally, only discretionary appeals are taken from decisions of 
superior courts acting in a review capacity over state and local boards 
and administrative agencies (e.g., State Board of Workers’ 
Compensation) and lower courts (e.g., magistrate courts), with limited 
exceptions as set forth in the statute. 40  Of course, the same 
jurisdictional divide applies to discretionary appeals as well, creating 
somewhat of a counterintuitive situation where certain cases deemed 
insignificant enough to deny appeal as a matter of right will 
nevertheless fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court. Some prominent examples include divorce and alimony cases, 
as well as petitions for habeas corpus. As a result, the Supreme Court 
decides more discretionary applications per judge than the Court of 
Appeals.41 The Supreme Court decides around 600–700 discretionary 
applications each year, not far behind the approximately 850 decided 
by the Court of Appeals.42 
In addition, the courts must hear direct interlocutory appeals of trial 
court decisions granting summary judgment, even in part, unless the 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Scruggs v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 408 S.E.2d 103, 104 (Ga. 1991). 
 38. Id. 
 39. § 5-6-35. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See infra Table 5—Approximate Potential Increase in Applications for Discretionary Appellate 
Review. 
 42. Id. 
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case is governed by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35.43 The courts must also hear 
interlocutory appeals of orders certifying or refusing to certify a class 
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23. 44  The courts also have the 
discretionary authority to review other interlocutory decisions upon 
application where a trial judge has certified “that the order, decision, 
or judgment is of such importance to the case that immediate review 
should be had.”45 
B.   Georgia’s Overworked Court of Appeals 
1.   1996 Report of the Commission on the Appellate Courts of 
Georgia 
In 1996, after a request was made for the addition of four judges to 
the Georgia Court of Appeals, Georgia’s General Assembly added one 
judge and created the Commission on the Appellate Courts of 
Georgia.46 The Commission was tasked with “undertaking a study of 
the current structure and operations of the appellate courts of the State 
of Georgia with the goal of determining what changes, if any, should 
be recommended in such structure and operations in order to” meet six 
specific goals, including (1) ensuring “a high quality of appellate 
review of trial court decisions where such review is required or 
appropriate” and (2) facilitating “the development of an organized and 
consistent body of appellate decisions for the guidance of the bench, 
the bar, and the general public.” 47  Its membership included state 
legislators, judges, the state bar president, and a practicing attorney.48 
The Commission determined “that the most immediate problem” 
facing Georgia’s appellate court system “is the caseload of the Court 
of Appeals.” 49  The Commission observed that there are “two 
approaches” to address this problem: “(1) more judges, or (2) fewer 
                                                                                                                 
 43. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(h) (2012). 
 44. § 9-11-23(g). 
 45. § 5-6-34(b). 
 46. CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5, at 1. 
 47. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 48. Id. at 7. 
 49. Id. at 2. 
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appeals, either by shifting jurisdiction to other courts or reducing the 
right to appellate review.”50 In addition to simply hiring more judges, 
the Commission considered ten potential options aimed at reducing the 
court’s workload through structural changes: 
1) The clarification or redefinition of the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court of Georgia and the Court of Appeals, either 
through enactment of legislation or amendment of the 
Constitution; 
2) The creation of new district courts of appeal or the division of 
the current Court of Appeals into a Court of Civil Appeals and a 
Court of Criminal Appeals, with additional judges; 
3) The creation of an appellate division of the superior courts 
staffed by superior court judges, senior judges, and other judges 
willing to serve voluntarily on such cases with adequate staff, 
offices, state funding, and compensation; 
4) The shifting of workers’ compensation cases from the Court of 
Appeals to the Supreme Court; 
5) The elimination of one level of appeal in workers’ 
compensation, which now can go through four levels of appeal at 
great cost and delay and with infrequent reversal; 
6) An increase in monetary amounts covered by the discretionary 
appeal procedure of Code Section 5-6-35 of the O.C.G.A.; 
7) The establishment of a court with jurisdiction to hear appeals 
in matters involving family law, including divorce, child custody, 
support, and juvenile matters, or the consolidation of these appeals 
into the same court; 
8) The consolidation of appeals in cases in which a sentence of 
life imprisonment or the death sentence is or could be imposed 
into the same court; 
9) Making appeals in misdemeanor cases discretionary rather than 
direct appeals, making appeals of one or more types of 
misdemeanors discretionary, or making appeals in traffic cases 
discretionary; and 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at 4. 
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10) Abolishing the right to an interlocutory appeal from the partial 
grant of summary judgment.51 
The Commission did not recommend any of these options, 
concluding that “[a] suggestion for significant jurisdictional changes 
is an important decision which, if to be recommended, should be 
undertaken only after very careful further study.”52 Highlighting the 
competing tensions between the two basic ways to reduce the Court of 
Appeals’ caseload—hiring more judges or reducing the number of 
appeals—the Commission noted both that “[i]t is difficult to reach a 
decision which reduces the access of Georgia’s citizens to their 
courts[,]” and that “[t]he costs of each proposal must [] be studied.”53 
Ultimately, the Commission recommended the immediate addition 
of a new panel of three Court of Appeals judges and the establishment 
of a new commission to develop 
a plan to modernize and improve the appellate court system . . . . 
This plan should include the possible revision of jurisdiction 
between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the possible 
future addition of judges to the Court of Appeals, and the possible 
creation of an appellate division of the superior courts. The goal 
should be to have in place by the year 2000 a streamlined, modern, 
and efficient appellate court system in which jurisdictional 
division is clear and the appellate courts are given the resources 
needed, on a continuing basis, to render high quality and cost 
effective service to the people of Georgia.54 
2.   2001 Report of the Supreme Court of Georgia Blue Ribbon 
Commission on the Judiciary 
In March 1999, the Supreme Court of Georgia created the Blue 
Ribbon Commission on the Judiciary.55 The Commission was created 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. at 4–5. 
 52. CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5, at 5. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 6. 
 55. Creswell, supra note 20, at 3. 
11
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“for the express purpose of considering the ‘structure and organization 
of the courts as they relate to efficiency and effectiveness in the 
dispensation of justice.’” 56  The Commission was led by former 
Georgia Supreme Court Justice Hardy Gregory, Jr. and consisted “of 
twenty members including current and former judges and justices, 
practicing lawyers, and private citizens.”57 
In its discussion of Georgia’s appellate system, the Commission 
noted the recommendations of the 1996 Commission and the progress 
that the state had made toward those goals by adding three Court of 
Appeals judges.58 Though the Commission generally agreed with the 
1996 Commission’s basic recommendations, the Commission did not 
substantively discuss any of the major structural changes suggested by 
the 1996 Commission.59 
Instead, the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended the following 
changes to Georgia’s appellate system: (1) increasing the size of the 
court of appeals “in the future as may become necessary to 
accommodate its caseload[,]” and (2) reassigning direct appellate 
jurisdiction for divorce and equity cases from the Supreme Court to 
the Court of Appeals.60 As the report itself suggests, both of these 
recommendations are modest. 61  With regard to the first 
recommendation, the Blue Ribbon Commission acknowledged that 
“[t]he work of deciding appeals in both of Georgia’s appellate courts 
has increased dramatically due to the effects of several forces” related 
to population growth.62 As a result, Georgia’s “supreme court and 
court of appeals [are] described as carrying a caseload burden per 
judge that is among the highest in the United States.”63 Despite these 
observations, the Commission did not recommend an immediate 
expansion of judgeships from the twelve approved in 1999.64 Instead, 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. (quoting the 1999 Georgia Supreme Court Order establishing the Blue Ribbon Commission on 
the Judiciary). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 11, 13. 
 59. See id. at 11–14. 
 60. Id. at 10–11. 
 61. See Creswell, supra note 20, at 11, 14. 
 62. Id. at 12. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 11–14. 
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the Commission noted that “[t]here is no doubt that the latest increase 
in the size of the court of appeals will not be the last as the forces 
producing more lawsuits and more appeals continue to transform our 
state.”65 
Similarly, the Blue Ribbon Commission report recommendation 
regarding the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was restrained. The 
Commission acknowledged the “national movement against by-pass 
appeals directly to the court of last resort in states having intermediate 
appellate courts[,]” the American Bar Association’s recommendation 
that state supreme courts “exercise only discretionary review[,]” and 
the recommendations of previous Georgia commissions to limit the 
direct appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to “cases on writs of 
certiorari, certified cases from state and federal appellate courts, 
constitutional cases, election contests, death penalty cases, habeas 
cases and extraordinary writs.”66 Despite this movement against direct 
appeals to the Supreme Court, the Commission “recommend[ed] an 
incremental step in the direction of narrowing the supreme court’s 
jurisdiction”—eliminating the supreme court’s equity and divorce 
jurisdiction.67 Shifting these two types of appeals from the Supreme 
Court to the Court of Appeals is a conservative and incremental 
emphasis of the Court of Appeals’ role in the correction of errors and 
of the Supreme Court’s responsibility for the coherence and integrity 
of legal doctrine and the legal process.68 
These modest recommendations were consistent with the Blue 
Ribbon Commission’s ultimate conclusion “that the judicial needs of 
Georgians are being well served.”69 “While each recommendation of 
the Commission is submitted in the belief that its implementation will 
result in the incremental enhancement of our judicial system, the 
Commission has concluded that there is no need for sweeping revision 
of the structures and processes of our courts.”70 Since the Blue Ribbon 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 12. 
 66. Id. at 13–14. 
 67. Creswell, supra note 20, at 14. 
 68. Id. at 13. 
 69. Id. at 39. 
 70. Id. 
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Commission report was published, the Georgia legislature has not 
increased the number of court of appeals judgeships or modified the 
direct appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.71 
II.   ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
A.   Problems From 1996 Still Exist 
Although the Blue Ribbon Commission’s report struck a largely 
positive tone, the problems identified by the 1996 Commission’s 
report still exist. 72  Despite some modest improvements, Georgia’s 
appellate courts continue to be some of the busiest in the nation, and 
the anachronistic jurisdictional split continues to create unnecessary 
tension and confusion within the appellate system.73 
1.   The Georgia Court of Appeals Continues to be one of the 
Busiest Intermediate Appellate Courts in the Nation 
As shown by the statistical tables below,74 the workload of the 
Georgia Court of Appeals has improved since the 1996 Commission 
published its report. Despite Georgia’s rapid population growth, 
annual filings in both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court 
have held remarkably steady from 1992 to 2012. The steady number 
of filings during this time period and the addition of three new judges 
on the Court of Appeals have combined to appreciably reduce the 
number of opinions each Court of Appeals judge must write every 
year. But there is still work to be done. Even with these improvements, 
“both Georgia appellate courts regularly remain in the top four state 
supreme and intermediate appellate courts in opinion load.”75 
Furthermore, the changes to the direct appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court discussed in this article will necessarily increase the 
                                                                                                                 
 71. MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:5, at 20. 
 72. See generally id. § 1:6, 1:7 (discussing the structural problems of Georgia’s appellate courts). 
 73. Id. 
 74. The statistical tables in this section present the total number of cases filed in and decisions written 
by the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals from 1992 through 2012, including per-judge filings and 
written decisions. 
 75. MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:7, at 25–26, app. 1. 
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workload of the Court of Appeals. 76  For instance, in 2011, 
approximately 1,500 of the 2,107 filings in the Georgia Supreme Court 
did not first go through the Court of Appeals.77 While most of these 
matters did not require a written opinion,78 shifting these filings to the 
Court of Appeals would increase the total number of filings in the 
already-overworked court by over 40%.79 Without an increase in the 
number of judges, this increase in the Court of Appeals’ workload may 
lead the court to dispose of more cases with non-binding “physical 
precedent” opinions, 80  which have been described as “a 
counterbalance to [the] institutional and caseload pressures that inhibit 
deliberation among the judges of the Georgia Court of Appeals.”81 
These pressures are made all the greater—both at the Court of Appeals 
and Supreme Court—by Georgia’s constitutional mandate that the 
Court of Appeals decide all appeals within two court terms (the “two-
term rule”).82 This means that three times a year, at the end of each of 
the courts’ three terms, the judges and Justices must scramble to finish 
the cases set for the previous term lest they be automatically affirmed 
without opinion.83 
The statistical tables below collect data published in the 1994–2012 
Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of the Courts.84  The 
tables show the total annual filings, written opinions, filings per judge, 
and opinions per judge for both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme 
Court from 1992 through 2012. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 77. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF GA., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT: GEORGIA 
COURTS FY 2012 20 (2012). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. In Georgia, decisions in which a member of a three-judge panel concurs in the judgment only is 
called “physical precedent” and cannot be cited as binding authority. See, e.g., Muldrow v. State, 744 
S.E.2d 413, 418 nn.27 & 29 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (describing physical precedent rule). 
 81. James C. Bonner, Jr. et al., “Physical Precedent” Under Court of Appeals Rule 33(a), APP. REV., 
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 1, 3. 
 82. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 9, para. 2 (“The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals shall dispose of 
every case at the term for which it is entered on the court’s docket for hearing or at the next term.”). 
 83. MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 2:4, at 38–39. 
 84. The Georgia Administrative Office of the Courts releases annual reports. Annual Reports, ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, http://georgiacourts.gov/index.php/researchacaseload/105 (last visited Apr. 5, 
2014). 
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Table 2—Total Filings and Written Opinions* 
 
Year Court of 
Appeals 
Opinions 
(Published/ 
(unpublished) 
Supreme 
Court 
Written 
Opinions 
1992 3,412 2,065** 1,784 305 
1993 3,530 2,183** 1,910 344 
1994 3,911 2,315** 1,961 401 
1995 3,635 1,860** 2,080 421 
1996 3,450 1,805** 1,975 404 
1997 3,513 1,875** 2,118 364 
1998 3,366 1,899 (1,592/307) 1,899 394 
1999 3,359 1,920 (1,667/253) 1,828 402 
2000 3,434 1,877 (1,551/326) 1,879 371 
2001 3,313 1,858 (1,448/410) 1,856 356 
2002 3,260 1,803 (1,540/263) 1,889 356 
2003 3,444 1,782 (1,488/294) 1,882 364 
2004 3,238 1,765 (1,497/268) 1,976 347 
2005 3,139 1,581 (1,389/192) 1,949 400 
2006 3,303 1,596 (1,390/206) 2,167 352 
2007 3,280 1,624 (1,359/265) 1,877 347 
2008 3,273 1,533 (1,322/211) 2,073 391 
2009 3,260 1,644 (1,277/367–
includes Rule 36)85 
1,979 325 
2010 3,212 1,500 (1,070/430–
includes Rule 36) 
2,036 357 
2011 3,448 N/A 2,107 314 
2012 3,464 1,703 (1,239/464) 1,936 231 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Under Georgia Court of Appeals Rule 36, cases may be affirmed without opinion when: 
(1) the evidence supports the judgment; (2) no reversible error of law appears and an 
opinion would have no precedential value; (3) the judgment of the court below adequately 
explains the decision; and/or (4) the issues are controlled adversely to the appellant for the 
reasons and authority given in the appellee’s brief . . . Rule 36 cases have no precedential 
value. 
GA. CT. APP. R. 36; see also MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 21:1, at 643–44. 
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* Data taken from the 1994–2012 Annual Reports of the Georgia 
Administrative Office of the Courts. 
** Prior to 1998, the Annual Reports make no distinction between 
published and unpublished opinions. 
 
Table 3—Total Filings and Published Opinions Per Judge* 
 
Year Filings Per 
CoA Judge 
Published 
Opinions Per 
CoA Judge 
Filings Per 
S.Ct. Justice 
Opinions 
Per S.Ct. 
Justice 
1992 379     229** 255 44 
1993 392     243** 273 39 
1994 435     257** 280 57 
1995 404     207** 297 60 
1996 345     181** 282 58 
1997 351     188** 303 52 
1998 337 159 271 56 
1999 280 139 261 57 
2000 286 129 268 53 
2001 276 121 265 51 
2002 272 128 270 51 
2003 287 124 269 52 
2004 270 125 282 50 
2005 262 116 278 57 
2006 275 116 310 50 
2007 273 113 268 50 
2008 273 110 296 56 
2009 272 106 283 46 
2010 268 89 291 51 
2011 287 N/A 301 45 
2012 289 103 277 33 
* Data taken from the 1994–2012 Annual Reports of the Georgia 
Administrative Office of the Courts. 
** Includes unpublished opinions. 
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2.   The Jurisdictional Division Between the Supreme Court and 
the Court of Appeals Continues to Create Tension and Confusion 
As explained above, the jurisdictional division between the 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals has been essentially unchanged 
since 1916.86 This historical conception of the respective roles of the 
courts is out of line with modern appellate practice, and the subject 
matter split in direct appellate jurisdiction continues to cause confusion 
in Georgia’s appellate system.87 The Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeals were originally viewed as dual courts of last resort.88 Today, 
the “large majority” of the forty states with an intermediate appellate 
court “have a supreme court with exclusively or primarily certiorari or 
other discretionary jurisdiction, and an intermediate court of appeals 
for original appellate jurisdiction in most cases.”89 
In its first decision discussing its new certiorari jurisdiction under 
the 1916 Constitution, Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Yesbik, the 
Supreme Court recognized the tension created by grafting certiorari 
review onto an appellate system that historically functioned as dual 
courts of last resort.90 The Yesbik Court observed that, under both the 
1907 and 1916 Constitutions, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme 
Court were: 
each final in their respective jurisdictions, but the latter was bound 
to follow the decisions of the former . . . . The cleavage of 
jurisdiction between the two courts of review was clearly drawn, 
and within its jurisdiction the Court of Appeals was designed to 
be a court of last resort. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and 
the Court of Appeals is not concurrent, but exclusive in the 
particular sphere of each . . . . 
[The certiorari] provision [in the 1916 Constitution] was 
manifestly intended to vest in this court a comprehensive power, 
extending to the review of any decision pronounced by the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 86. MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:3, at 9. 
 87. See id. § 1:6, at 21–22. 
 88. Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Yesbik, 91 S.E. 873, 874 (Ga. 1917). 
 89. MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:6, at 20–21. 
 90. Yesbik, 91 S.E. at 874. 
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of Appeals; but, when considered in connection with the whole 
constitutional scheme of two reviewing courts, and in the light of 
the history of the two courts, it is manifest that a careless exercise 
of the power would defeat the very purpose of the institution of 
the Court of Appeals . . . . This court, therefore, should be chary 
of action in respect to certiorari, and should not require by 
certiorari any case to be certified from the Court of Appeals for 
review and determination unless it involves gravity and 
importance.91 
In more recent years, the Supreme Court has explicitly addressed 
the issues created by Georgia’s jurisdictional division. 92  Most 
famously, in Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Ass’n, Inc., Presiding Justice 
Fletcher’s concurring opinion observed with respect to equity 
jurisdiction that the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals: 
often spend more time in routine cases deciding which court has 
jurisdiction than in deciding which party should win on appeal and 
why. The disproportionate amount of time spent on resolving 
disputes concerning appellate jurisdiction creates unnecessary 
tension between our appellate courts, squanders limited judicial 
resources, and ultimately harms society by diverting attention 
from the resolution of more important issues.93 
To address this issue, Justice Fletcher observed that “[t]his state needs 
to move away from its parallel appellate court structure, which is 
antiquated, inefficient, and confusing, to a two-tier structure where the 
supreme court functions as a court of last resort.”94 Justice Fletcher 
advocated adopting the appellate structure described in the American 
Bar Association’s Model Judicial Article: 
Under this model, the intermediate appellate court serves 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. 
 92. Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Ass’n, 524 S.E.2d 464, 469–70 (Ga. 1999) (Fletcher, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. at 469. 
 94. Id. at 470. 
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primarily as a court to correct error in individual cases and the 
supreme court functions to interpret and develop case law for 
general application. Thus, this division gives the supreme court 
the discretion to decide cases involving an issue of first 
impression, the subject of conflicting authorities, or a matter of 
importance to the general public or the administration of justice. 
. . . . 
Until our state revises the structure and jurisdiction of our 
appellate courts, however, this court and the court of appeals must 
continue to struggle with how to define the classes of cases for 
which the supreme court has general appellate jurisdiction, of 
which equity cases are a small part, and this court must continue 
to spend most of its time functioning as a court to correct error 
rather than to develop the law.95 
In addition to causing confusion, the jurisdictional split creates 
institutional tension between the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals.96 As discussed in Redfearn, the Supreme Court would best 
serve its institutional function by focusing on developing the law.97 
And as set forth in the previous section, any reduction in the Supreme 
Court’s direct appellate jurisdiction would necessarily increase the 
already heavy workload of the Court of Appeals.98 Notably, the 1996 
Commission believed that the tension between the interests of the two 
courts was significant enough that: 
any continuation of this commission or another commission be 
restructured so that no current members of the Supreme Court or 
Court of Appeals are included as members of the commission. 
Current or former members of the appellate courts have valuable 
information which should be received and utilized; however, 
recommendations that involve choosing between sometimes 
competing points of view can be made more easily and effectively 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 469. 
 97. Id. at 470. 
 98. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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by those with no immediate or direct stake in the appellate 
courts.99 
To date, the Georgia legislature has made no change to the division 
of jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, 
and the problems described by Justice Fletcher in Redfearn persist.100 
These problems are front and center in the recent decision, Durham v. 
Durham.101 Durham was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals, 
which transferred it to the Supreme Court because it involved the 
internal affairs of a trust.102 Under the Georgia statute, “‘[t]rusts are 
peculiarly subjects of equity jurisdiction.’”103  Consequently, at the 
trial level, “‘[a]ctions concerning the construction, administration, or 
internal affairs of a trust’”104 must be filed in superior court because, 
under Georgia’s Constitution, the superior courts have “exclusive 
jurisdiction in ‘equity cases.’” 105  Despite the fact that Georgia’s 
constitutional and statutory law recognizes the inherently equitable 
nature of trusts, the Supreme Court held in a 4–3 decision that the case 
did not fall within the Court’s equity jurisdiction, even though it was 
in the equitable jurisdiction of the trial court.106 
In a dissent, Presiding Justice Hunstein stated that “as a matter of 
policy” she “agree[s] with the majority that ‘equity cases’ should go to 
the Court of Appeals.” 107  However, in the absence of legislative 
changes to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, Justice Hunstein 
disapproved of the Supreme Court’s trend toward unilaterally limiting 
its direct jurisdiction by adopting narrow interpretations of the Georgia 
Constitution’s jurisdictional grant: 
In this case, I would retain jurisdiction for two reasons. One, if the 
                                                                                                                 
 99. CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5, at 6. 
 100. See generally Durham v. Durham, 728 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. 2012). 
 101. See generally id. 
 102. Id. at 628. 
 103. Id. at 629 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-12-6(a)–(b)). 
 104. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-12-6(a)–(b)). 
 105. Id. (quoting GA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, para. 1). 
 106. Durham, 728 S.E.2d at 629–31. 
 107. Id. at 631 (Hunstein, J., dissenting). 
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term “equity cases” means anything today, then it should include 
appeals in express trust cases where the remedies to beneficiaries 
are exclusively equitable and the issue on appeal is the legality or 
propriety of that equitable relief. Second, if we continue our recent 
practice of narrowly defining the issue on appeal, the result will 
be the same as in this case—a transfer to the Court of Appeals—
even in subject matter areas that have in the past been exclusively 
within our jurisdiction.108 
Justice Hunstein’s dissent seems to recognize that the expansive 
category of cases that are directly appealed to the Supreme Court has 
led to carving out exceptions and the narrow construing of these 
categories when what is needed is real reform of the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction. 
Finally, as discussed by Justice Fletcher in Redfearn, it is not ideal 
for the Supreme Court to spend significantly more time reviewing trial 
court decisions for error than it spends stating and clarifying important 
points of Georgia law.109 For example, it seems absurd that the highest 
court in Georgia must decide whether a trial court correctly determined 
that a tattoo parlor suffered “irreparable harm” when a former 
employee stole a single tattoo design, simply because the appeal falls 
within the court’s equity jurisdiction.110 While not all of the direct 
appeals to the Supreme Court involve petty matters, the overwhelming 
majority of the cases that the court disposes of by written decision do 
not have the benefit of first going through the Court of Appeals. For 
instance, in 2011, only 58 of the 314 cases that the Supreme Court 
decided by written opinion came from the Court of Appeals either by 
certification or certiorari.111 
The most alarming waste created by the archaic jurisdictional split 
in Georgia’s appellate system is the time that the Supreme Court and 
Court of Appeals spend considering which appellate court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal to hear it on the merits. This issue often 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Id. at 633 (Hunstein, J., dissenting). 
 109. Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Ass’n, 524 S.E.2d 464, 469–70 (Ga. 1999) (Fletcher, J., concurring). 
 110. See Owens v. Ink Wizard Tattoos, 533 S.E.2d 722, 723–24 (Ga. 2000). 
 111. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF GA., supra note 77, at 20. 
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results in transfers from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, 
which sometimes result in transfers back to the Court of Appeals and 
split decisions like Redfearn resulting in a tremendous waste of 
Georgia’s already taxed judicial resources. 
B.   Time for a New Look at Structural Change  
Despite persistent calls to modernize Georgia’s appellate system 
from both the judiciary and those who have studied it,112 Georgia’s 
legislature has failed to take significant action.113 While the increase 
in the size of the Court of Appeals to twelve following publication of 
the 1996 Report addressed the immediate workload crisis, that reform 
effort did not go far enough. Over a decade has passed since the Blue 
Ribbon Commission made its “conservative and incremental” 
recommendations for modest jurisdictional reforms that would place 
proper “emphasis [on] the court of appeals’ role in the correction of 
errors and [on] the supreme court’s responsibility for the coherence 
and integrity of legal doctrine and the legal process.”114 And yet, no 
changes have been made since the Commission issued its report, and 
Georgia retains fundamentally the same appellate system that it has 
had since 1916. 
Georgia is the eighth most populous state in the nation and the center 
of commerce in the Southeast,115 yet it continues to operate with an 
appellate system that is the product of historical accident rather than 
rational thought. Though Georgia’s judges and Justices have done a 
commendable job in challenging circumstances, Georgia would 
benefit from reforms modernizing its appellate court system. For 
example, because Georgia’s Supreme Court must spend the vast 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See Redfearn, 524 S.E.2d 464, 469–70 (Fletcher, J., concurring); Creswell, supra note 20, at 13; 
CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5. 
 113. MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:5, at 20. 
 114. Creswell, supra note 20, at 14. 
 115. See Andy Ambrose, Atlanta, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (June 5, 2014), 
http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/counties-cities-neighborhoods/atlanta; U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013, AM. FACT FINDER, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=PEP_2013_PEPANN
RES&prodType=table (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
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majority of its time reviewing trial court decisions for error,116  it 
cannot focus on using its role as a certiorari court to ensure a coherent, 
reasoned, and uniform body of law for the state. While the great many 
who have studied the issue agree that the Supreme Court’s direct 
appellate jurisdiction should be significantly reduced,117 the reality 
that any change would further increase the Court of Appeals’ heavy 
workload has served as a major roadblock to meaningful change. 
It is time for comprehensive change that fulfills the promise of the 
Blue Ribbon Commission report and brings our appellate system into 
the 21st century. 
1.   Recommendations for Comprehensive Reform of Georgia’s 
Appellate System That Should Occur Now 
As previous studies have recognized, meaningful reform of 
Georgia’s appellate system must address two interrelated issues: (1) 
the jurisdictional split between the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals and (2) the Court of Appeals’ caseload.118 While adopting 
either of these changes alone would be an improvement over Georgia’s 
current system, Georgia would be best served by simultaneously 
adopting both changes as part of a comprehensive reform effort. The 
legislature can only resolve the tension between the Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeals by adopting both changes at once. 
Eliminating most of the Supreme Court’s direct appellate jurisdiction 
without increasing the size of the Court of Appeals would eliminate 
the confusion in the current system, but it would exacerbate the Court 
of Appeals’ current workload problems. On the other hand, increasing 
the size of the Court of Appeals would reduce the court’s workload 
and potentially improve the quality of its opinions, but it would do 
nothing to address the fundamental structural problems caused by a 
jurisdictional split that survives today as an out-of-place relic of an 
earlier era. 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 117. See supra Part I.B. 
 118. Id. 
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a.   Converting the Supreme Court of Georgia Into a True 
Certiorari Court of Last Resort 
First, consistent with the recommendations in the 1996 Report, the 
legislature should reform the Supreme Court into a true certiorari court 
of last resort retaining direct appellate jurisdiction over only a select 
few types of appeals. While the Supreme Court’s direct appellate 
jurisdiction over constitutional issues and election contests can only be 
modified through a constitutional amendment,119 the legislature can, 
and should, eliminate the court’s direct appellate jurisdiction over all 
other categories of cases. There is no principled reason for the 
Supreme Court to serve as an error-correcting court over the vast 
majority of cases that are currently within its jurisdiction—equity 
cases, divorce cases, habeas corpus cases, cases involving 
extraordinary remedies, cases involving title to land, cases in which 
the death penalty was or could have been imposed, and cases involving 
the construction of wills. Moving direct appeals of these cases to the 
Court of Appeals will resolve the current confusion over the scope of 
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, and it will allow the Supreme Court 
to focus on serving the function that it should serve—creating a 
coherent, uniform body of legal precedent in Georgia. 
b.   The Size of the Court of Appeals Should be Increased to 
Address Historical Shortfalls and to Compensate for the Court’s 
Expanded Direct Appellate Jurisdiction 
Any change in the Supreme Court’s direct appellate jurisdiction 
requires a corresponding increase in the size of the Court of Appeals. 
It would make no sense to shift direct appellate jurisdiction over 
several categories of appeals from the Supreme Court to the Court of 
Appeals and not provide a corresponding expansion of the Court of 
Appeals to accommodate the change. Any benefit from the 
jurisdictional reform would be squandered by placing an additional 
unsustainable burden on the Court of Appeals. Due at least in part to 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Creswell, supra note 20, at 13. 
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the Court of Appeals’ heavy workload,120 oral argument occurs in only 
a small fraction of the appeals and the court’s members spend less time 
conferencing and discussing cases amongst themselves than is typical 
in other jurisdictions.121 Increasing the Court of Appeals’ workload 
through jurisdictional reform could exacerbate these problems and 
lead the court to further rely on unpublished and “physical 
precedent”122 decisions. Increasing the size of the court both to offset 
the court’s expanded jurisdiction and to remedy historical shortfalls in 
judicial capacity would give the judges more time to deliberate, hear 
oral arguments, and draft high quality opinions. 
Because many of the categories of cases within the Supreme Court’s 
direct appellate jurisdiction are subject to discretionary review under 
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35,123 shifting direct appellate jurisdiction to the Court 
of Appeals may only moderately increase the court’s workload as 
measured by opinions-per-judge. As shown by the table below, after 
subtracting the Supreme Court’s certiorari cases, the number of 
opinions that the Supreme Court has written annually from 2005 to 
2012 has ranged from 357 to 181. If all of these cases were transferred 
to the Court of Appeals, it would result in approximately a 25% 
increase in the court’s annual number of published cases. Because the 
Supreme Court would retain direct appellate jurisdiction over cases 
within its exclusive constitutional jurisdiction, the actual impact on the 
Court of Appeals in terms of written opinions would be smaller than 
these numbers suggest. 
At the same time, the number of applications for discretionary 
review filed in the Court of Appeals will increase by over 75%, and 
the additional time and resources that the court must spend on these 
cases should not be ignored. 
As suggested by the tables below, the legislature will need to expand 
the Court of Appeals by at least another three-judge panel—a 25% 
increase over the size of the current court—in order to handle the 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See supra Part I.B. 
 121. MCFADDEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:7, at 26. 
 122. See GA. CT. APP. R. 33. 
 123. See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (2012). 
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increase in workload caused by the proposed changes to the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 
 
Table 4—Approximate124 Maximum Potential Increase in Court 
of Appeals Opinion Load* 
 
Year125 S.Ct. 
Opinions w/o 
CoA 
Review126 
Published 
CoA 
Opinions 
Potential 
Total 
Published 
CoA 
Opinions 
Percent 
Increase 
2005 357 1,389 1,746 25.7% 
2006 312 1,390 1,702 22.4% 
2007 311 1,359 1,670 22.9% 
2008 324 1,322 1,646 24.5% 
2009 269 1,277 1,546 21.1% 
2010 298 1,070 1,368 27.9% 
2012 181 1,239 1,420 14.6% 
* Data taken from the 2005–2012 Annual Reports of the Georgia 
Administrative Office of the Courts. 
                                                                                                                 
 124. This table overestimates the extent to which the jurisdictional changes discussed in this article 
would increase the Court of Appeals’ opinion load. Because the annual reports do not include more 
detailed statistics, it is impossible to determine how many of the Supreme Court’s opinions involve the 
court’s exclusive constitutional direct appellate jurisdiction. In addition, a small number of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions every year answer questions certified by federal courts or the Georgia Court of Appeals. 
O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9 (2012); History of the Court of Appeals, supra note 2. Consequently, this table assumes 
a hypothetical worst-case scenario where all of the Supreme Court’s opinions that do not involve its 
certiorari jurisdiction would fall to the Court of Appeals. 
 125. 2011 is not included in this table because the Court of Appeals has not published a complete data 
set. 
 126. The figures in this column consist of the total number of written opinions published by the 
Supreme Court in a given year minus the number of granted petitions for certiorari listed in the “cases 
disposed” section of the Annual Reports for the Georgia Administrative Office of the Courts during the 
same year. Because it is unlikely that all—or perhaps any—of the writs of certiorari that are granted in a 
given year are disposed of by a written opinion the same year, the numbers in this column are not exact. 
However, because it is likely that the court eventually writes an opinion regarding most—if not all—of 
the cases that it deems important enough to grant a writ of certiorari, the numbers in this table serve as a 
reasonable year-to-year approximation of the number of opinions that the Supreme Court writes in cases 
where there has not been a Court of Appeals opinion. 
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Table 5—Approximate127 Potential Increase in Applications for 
Discretionary Appellate Review* 
 
Year Discretionary 
Applications 
Considered 
by the 
S.Ct.128 
Discretionary 
Applications 
Considered 
by the CoA129
Potential 
Increase 
Discretionary 
Applications 
Percent 
Increase 
2005 748 786 1,534 95.2% 
2006 632 798 1,430 79.2% 
2007 605 771 1,376 78.5% 
2008 715 830 1,545 86.1% 
2009 702 850 1,552 82.6% 
2010 670 848 1,581 79.0% 
2011 710 876 1,586 81.1% 
2012 600 850 1,450 70.6% 
* Data taken from the 2005–2012 Annual Reports of the Georgia 
Administrative Office of the Courts. 
 
There is a recent indication that the Georgia legislature is giving 
some thought to these issues. In the 2014 session, a resolution was 
introduced for the creation of the “Senate Study Committee on the 
Court of Appeals Workload.”130 The resolution noted that the total 
filings in the Court of Appeals in 2012 was 3,404 cases and a “study 
is needed to examine the workload of the Court of Appeals to 
determine if the composition of the Court of Appeals should be 
                                                                                                                 
 127. While almost all of the discretionary applications for appellate review currently within the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction will shift to the Court of Appeals if the reforms in this article are 
implemented, the Supreme Court would retain jurisdiction for discretionary interlocutory applications that 
fall within its exclusive constitutional jurisdiction. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 2. 
 128. The figures in this column include habeas corpus cases, cases covered by the discretionary appeals 
statute, discretionary interlocutory appeals, and applications for interim review of pre-trial superior court 
orders entered in cases in which the State intends to seek the death penalty. 
 129. The figures in this column include cases covered by the discretionary appeals statute, applications 
for discretionary interlocutory review, and emergency motions filed under Georgia Court of Appeals Rule 
40(b). 
 130. S. Res. 1053, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014). 
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increased to include another division of three judges.” 131  The 
resolution sought to establish a committee to study “the conditions, 
needs, issues, and problems[,]” and “recommend any action or 
legislation which the committee deems necessary or appropriate.”132 
The resolution was sponsored by Senators Joshua McKoon,133 Curt 
Thompson, Jesse Stone, and Bill Cowsert. While it was favorably 
reported out of the Judiciary Committee, it did not pass the Senate prior 
to the end of the 2014 legislative session. Fifteen years since the 1999 
addition of the twelfth judge to the Court of Appeals,134 perhaps this is 
a glimmer of hope that more progress will be made in the 2015 session, 
and the Georgia legislature will soon take steps to increase the size of 
the Court of Appeals to fifteen judges.135 
2.   Additional Caseload-Easing Proposals That Should be 
Considered 
Any effort to reform the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by 
shifting appellate jurisdiction over several categories of cases to the 
Court of Appeals would require, at a minimum, the addition of three 
judges to the Court of Appeals. After thoroughly reviewing the prior 
commission reports, analyzing the Georgia appellate courts system, 
and conducting numerous interviews of former and current Georgia 
appellate judges, legislators, and distinguished law professors, this 
much is clear. But this does not mean that adding judges is the only 
measure that should be considered for relieving the caseload burden of 
the Court of Appeals. There are additional, less expensive reforms that 
could also be considered for providing further relief, including several 
reviewed or suggested by the 1996 Commission Report. The 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the potential reform 
efforts discussed below comes in large part from the authors’ off-the-
                                                                                                                 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Senator McKoon currently serves as the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Senate 
Judiciary, GA. STATE SENATE, http://www.senate.ga.gov/committees/en-US/committee.aspx?Committee 
=80&Session=23 (last visited July 1, 2014). 
 134. History of the Court of Appeals, supra note 2. 
 135. The authors applaud the senators for introducing this resolution and giving thought and attention 
to this very important issue for our state. 
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record interviews with current and former Court of Appeals judges and 
Supreme Court Justices.136 
a.   Amending O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(g) to Allow Use of Current 
Superior Court Judges to “Sit by Designation” on Panels of the 
Court of Appeals 
One potential way to reduce the Court of Appeals’ workload without 
significantly increasing costs is to allow current superior court judges 
to sit by designation as a third judge on panels along with two of the 
current members of the Court of Appeals.137 Though this measure 
would be complex to implement, it has several advantages. Superior 
court judges are already on the state’s payroll, they know Georgia law, 
and it is likely that at least some superior court judges would appreciate 
the opportunity to serve temporarily on the Court of Appeals. In 
interviews, former and current judges and Justices reacted strongly to 
this proposed reform. While some interviewees thought the idea 
should be implemented, others raised objections. 
The first and most commonly raised objection was that superior 
court judges are busy with their own dockets and many judges may not 
have any time to devote to the Court of Appeals.138 This objection is 
undoubtedly true, but it can be addressed by creating a voluntary opt-
in program, where superior court judges with some availability and 
interest in handling appeals could participate as much or as little as 
they see fit. These judges would only need to travel to Atlanta for oral 
arguments and could sit as a third judge on non-argument panels that 
review appeals once briefing is completed and either recommend the 
case for oral argument or decide the case on the briefs. Optimistically, 
it is believed that many superior court judges would agree to 
participate once a year as a third judge on a dozen non-argument cases 
and sit in on a day or two of oral argument. In such a scenario, the 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Interview notes are on file with the authors. The interviewees declined to be identified for 
attribution. 
 137. Senior appellate judges and superior court judges could also be utilized assuming that it would be 
economically feasible to pay for their services. 
 138. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF GA., supra note 77, at 24. 
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superior court judge would likely only be responsible for drafting a 
handful of actual opinions. 
The second major objection was that the proposed reform would be 
administratively infeasible because of limited chambers space and the 
logistics of using “outside” judges who may not be familiar with the 
internal procedures and norms of the Court of Appeals. It may be too 
difficult to effectively handle appeals in which they are involved. One 
concern, for example, is that under the current system panels sit 
together on all cases for an entire calendar year.139 
Like the first objection, the second objection raises legitimate 
issues, but they are issues that can be addressed. First, it would not be 
necessary to do away with three-judge panels. Instead, the panels could 
remain in place with superior court judges added in lieu of one of the 
three current panel members for certain cases. An equal distribution of 
this substitution would provide caseload relief to the existing members 
of the Court of Appeals without undoing the panel assignment system. 
Second, superior court judges can draft opinions and review draft 
opinions from their own chambers, and the administrative staff and 
clerk’s office of the Court of Appeals can continue to handle all 
administrative aspects of the appeal. While the superior court judge 
would need to understand the timing and process for handling the 
appeals, a complete understanding of all the details of the internal 
operations of the Court of Appeals would not be necessary. With 
respect to the formatting of the opinions, the Court of Appeals’ staff 
attorneys would provide assistance as needed. 
Any of these same concerns could be suggested about the district 
judges who sit by designation on the federal courts of appeals.140 In the 
modern age of communication—with reliance on telephone and 
email—the administrative issues would not seem to impose a serious 
impediment to the use of superior court judges to sit by designation as 
a third judge on three-judge panels of the Court of Appeals. 
                                                                                                                 
 139. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 5, para. 2; History of the Court of Appeals, supra note 2. 
 140. Alyson M. Palmer, Expect to See More Visiting Judges at 11th Circuit, DAILY REPORT (Jan. 13, 
2014), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202637693627. 
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This idea borrows aspects of internal operations at the federal circuit 
courts of appeal. For instance, the Eleventh Circuit has long operated 
as one of the busiest regional appellate courts in the federal system,141 
but has relieved pressure on its sitting judges by routinely having a 
third judge from a district court or different courts of appeal sit on 
appellate panels.142 In addition, federal courts of appeal use panels to 
separate more easily decided appeals that can be efficiently resolved 
without oral argument from more difficult appeals for which oral 
argument would be beneficial.143 
When caseload overtaxes the capacity of appellate judges to 
review personally, to discuss collegially, and to endorse 
collectively a written statement of the reasons for decision in each 
case on their docket, the imperative to decide is in tension with 
other fundamental values of appeal. If mechanisms are not 
developed to cope with docket overload, an appellate court cannot 
satisfactorily meet its obligation to individual litigants—the 
correction of prejudicial trial court error—much less its 
institutional obligations to declare precedent and to supervise the 
overall administration of justice by the trial courts. But unless 
caseload control mechanisms permit adequate participation by the 
parties in the proceedings which determine their fate, while 
preserving the court-like characteristics that legitimate the 
exercise of judicial power, other significant values of appeal are 
in jeopardy. The principal caseload control mechanism developed 
by the United States courts of appeals and similarly burdened state 
appellate courts is the practice of “screening” their dockets to 
                                                                                                                 
 141. In 2013, the Eleventh Circuit produced 319 written opinions per judge, while the second busiest 
court last year produced 243 written opinions, and the national average was 186 written opinions. U.S. 
Court of Appeals—Judicial Caseload Profile, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/ 
uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2013/appeals-fcms-profiles-september-
2013.pdf&page=21 (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). This caseload is part of a long-term trend. From 2008 to 
2013, the Eleventh Circuit produced an average of 251 opinions per judge, while the national average was 
165. Id. 
 142. In fact, because the Eleventh Circuit has four vacancies, Chief Judge Ed Carnes has declared an 
emergency and allowed the use of two visiting judges on three-judge panels. Palmer, supra note 140. 
 143. John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit’s Experience in the Eighties and 
Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 BYU L. REV. 859, 863 (1991). 
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identify cases appropriate for procedural short-cuts.144 
Notably, the statutory framework for this use of superior court 
judges is already in place. The Georgia Code Section governing 
procedures in the Georgia Court of Appeals provides: 
Whenever the court unanimously determines that the business of 
the court requires the temporary assistance of an additional judge 
or additional judges or one additional panel, the court may request 
the assistance of senior appellate judges as provided in Chapter 
3A of this title or senior superior court judges as provided in Code 
Section 47-23-101 [see also O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9.2]. The Judge 
whose case assignment is transferred to the additional judge shall 
not vote on the case.145 
This provision could be repurposed to remove its limited application 
to senior superior court judges and temporary nature. It could then be 
amended to set forth a screening procedure, or screening could be left 
to the Court of Appeals to handle through its rules and internal 
operating procedures. 
While allowing superior court judges to serve by designation on the 
Court of Appeals would be a complex reform to implement, it is also 
one of the most feasible ways to reduce the court’s workload without 
significantly increasing costs. Because district court judges already sit 
by designation in the Eleventh Circuit, there is evidence that this 
reform can be successfully implemented. Furthermore, because 
Georgia already has an existing statutory framework for judges who 
sit by designation, it should be straightforward for the legislature to 
expand the circumstances in which designation is appropriate. In sum, 
further consideration should be given to whether some use of superior 
court judges sitting by designation would help reduce the workload of 
the Court of Appeals. Even modest relief would be welcomed, and the 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Id. at 860. 
 145. O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(g) (2012). 
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experience gained by the superior court judges would benefit 
Georgia’s trial court system. 
b.   Allowing Dissents in Three-Judge Panels 
Unlike other courts sitting in three-judge panels, the Georgia Court 
of Appeals does not have two-to-one split decisions.146 If any judge on 
a three-judge panel dissents, rather than issuing an opinion, the case is 
decided by a seven-judge panel.147 This requirement, coupled with 
pressure created by the two-term rule, has given rise to situations 
where a third judge on a three-judge panel will simply concur in the 
judgment without joining the opinion or drafting a separate concurring 
opinion.148 Under Court of Appeals Rule 33, these opinions that do not 
achieve the full panel’s consensus are called physical precedent and 
are not binding on future panels.149 The workload at the Court of 
Appeals could be reduced by a simple amendment to O.C.G.A. § 15-
3-1(c) eliminating the automatic seven-judge panel, and yet preserving 
the en banc review process: 
(1) Each division shall hear and determine, independently of the 
others, the cases assigned to it, except that the division next in line 
in rotation and a seventh Judge shall participate in the 
determination of each case in which there is a dissent in the 
division to which the case was originally assigned. 
(2) In all cases which involve one or more questions which, in the 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs of Jefferson v. Teton Corp., 3 N.E.3d 556, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); 
State v. Sanders, 753 S.E.2d 713, 718 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014); Salvato v. Salvato, 2 N.E.3d 974, 989–90 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2013). 
 147. § 15-3-1(c)(1). 
 148. See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 369 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (Deen, J., concurring dubitante). 
 149. GA. CT. APP. R. 33.To prevent a considered opinion from becoming physical precedent, Judge 
Braswell Deen in the late 1980s revived a practice not widely used at the court since the early twentieth 
century by concurring dubitante. Judge Deen “consider[ed] dubitante a weak concurrence, but 
nevertheless a full concurrence” which had many “laudable attributes” including making the decision 
binding precedent. Floyd, 369 S.E.2d at 318 (Deen, J., concurring dubitante). The concurrence dubitante 
has reappeared in the last few years, though by reading the opinions it seems the judges do not consider a 
concurrence dubitante a full concurrence. Nalley v. Langdale, 734 S.E.2d 908, 922 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) 
(Dillard, J., concurring dubitante) (“Unfortunately, our constitutional duty to resolve this appeal today 
(within two terms of docketing) precludes me from engaging in the type of extended study necessary to 
achieve a high degree of confidence that my experienced, able colleagues are right.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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opinion of the majority of the Judges of the division or of the two 
divisions plus a seventh Judge to which a case is assigned, should 
be passed upon by all the members of the court, the questions may 
be presented to all the members of the court; and if a majority of 
all the members of the court decide that the question or questions 
involved should, in their judgment and discretion, be decided by 
all the members of the court, the case shall be passed upon by all 
the members of the court, provided that a majority of the Judges 
passing upon the case concur in the judgment.150 
With the enactment of this reform, it would no longer be mandatory 
for a seven-judge panel to decide any case in which there is a dissent. 
This would reduce the court’s workload to some extent, and it may 
encourage judges to issue written dissents, which could potentially aid 
the development of Georgia’s law. 
Instead of automatically reviewing cases in which there is a dissent 
in seven-judge panels, the Court of Appeals could consider whether to 
permit parties to file motions seeking rehearing en banc following a 
decision by a panel in addition or in lieu of the traditional motion for 
reconsideration. There is currently no means in the Court of Appeals’ 
rules for a party to seek rehearing en banc or initiate any review of the 
decision by other members of the court not involved in the panel’s 
decision.151 Many appellate practitioners in Georgia consider this a 
significant shortcoming, and replacing the seven-judge panels for 
cases involving a dissent with an opportunity for parties to seek 
rehearing en banc would be a significant improvement in the Georgia 
appellate system. 
c.   Appellate Mediation 
The Court of Appeals has attempted in the past to create an appellate 
mediation program to relieve part of its caseload.152 Meetings were 
                                                                                                                 
 150. O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(c) (2012) (suggested amendment added). 
 151. See GA. CT. APP. R. 37. 
 152. Details regarding the Georgia Court of Appeals prior attempt at creating a mediation program 
came from multiple interviews with former and current Court of Appeals’ judges. The interviewees 
declined to be identified for attribution, and interview notes are on file with the authors. 
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held with Steve Kinnard, the eponymous mediator from the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals mediation center. The mediation program did 
not ultimately succeed, with reasons ranging from a lack of enthusiasm 
from the bench and bar to the fact that the mediation program was not 
mandatory (i.e., the court lacked the power to send appeals to 
mediation without the consent of the parties). 
In interviews, judges were split on whether it would be worthwhile 
to implement an appellate mediation program, but everyone agreed 
that it would be necessary to make changes to the prior system. Most 
significantly, interviewees uniformly agreed that any mediation 
program would need to be mandatory for it to have any chance of 
working, and the judges would get to select which cases go to 
mediation. Even with a mandatory program, some judges and Justices 
were skeptical that an appellate mediation program would work 
because, in most cases, one of the parties in mediation would have just 
won at the trial level and might not be inclined to negotiate away the 
win. Another obstacle is the constitutionally-imposed two-term rule. 
Some of the interviewed judges expressed legitimate concern that time 
spent on an unsuccessful mediation may leave the court with too little 
time to resolve the appeal. 
Ultimately, appellate mediation is an idea that merits further 
consideration, but it may not be worth implementing. Although the 
resolution of even a small number of appeals each year through the 
mediation process would likely provide some relief to the Court of 
Appeals, the anticipated reduction in workload would need to be 
compared to the cost of the mediation program (and the cost of other 
alternatives that might be more effective). 
d.   Subject Matter and Regional Courts of Appeal 
Looking at the intermediate appellate court structure of some other 
states, the prior commissions included consideration of dividing the 
Court of Appeals into a civil court and a criminal court or creating 
regional courts of appeal. For instance, Texas partially splits appellate 
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jurisdiction between civil and criminal. 153  Florida splits its 
intermediate appellate courts into regional districts of appeal.154 
Specialized subject-matter courts necessarily have more specialized 
judges than those sitting on the current Georgia Court of Appeals—a 
completely generalist institution. By developing more specialized 
judges, that follow a more uniform jurisprudence, specialized appellate 
courts can create efficiencies in appellate practice.155 Any inefficiency 
created by different judges being able only to hear certain types of 
appeals (for example, if the civil caseload vastly outstrips the criminal 
caseload) can be cured by appropriately redistributing the judgeships 
between the two courts as retirements create new judicial openings, 
and perhaps even at the end of election cycles for members of the court. 
Potential divisions include not only civil and criminal, but also 
specialized courts for workers’ compensation or family law.156 At the 
same time, there is some concern that having elected judges to a court 
who handle only criminal appeals results in candidates battling each 
other for the title of “toughest on crime.”157 
A second, potentially more complicated, option for decreasing the 
caseload of the Georgia Court of Appeals would be to divide the court 
into regional circuit courts of appeal. The regional court system would 
comprise combinations of Georgia’s forty-nine already existing 
superior court circuits. In such a system, the court could still meet in 
Atlanta-based sessions for en banc hearings to resolve splits among the 
regional circuits. Any amount of regional courts of appeal would 
require new courtrooms, courthouses, and administrative personnel. 
Moreover, with the concentration of people in metropolitan Atlanta 
and the absence of other large population centers in the state, Georgia 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Texas, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/State_Court_ 
Structure_Charts/Texas.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
 154. Florida, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/State_Court_ 
Structure_Charts/Florida.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
 155. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent 
Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 393, 408–09 (2011). 
 156. CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5, at 5. 
 157. Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate Criminal 
Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1109–12 (2006). 
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is not the same natural fit for regional courts of appeal as other states, 
such as Florida.158 
In interviews, Georgia’s current and former appellate judges were 
uniformly opposed to creating regional courts of appeal or dividing the 
Court of Appeals into a civil and criminal division. Though the judges 
acknowledged that having one generalized court might be impractical 
once the court reaches a certain size, everyone interviewed believed 
that the current court is nowhere near that size. The interviewees were 
concerned that dividing the court would negatively impact the court’s 
culture and working relationships. 
In sum, these ideas may warrant further consideration, should the 
Georgia Court of Appeals become so large in number to necessitate it 
(e.g., increase beyond the fifteen judges proposed in this article). But 
splitting the court is not itself a solution for reducing the workload of 
the Court of Appeals. As the 1996 Commission put it, it comes down 
to more judges or fewer appeals.159 
CONCLUSION 
Significant change to the Georgia appellate courts will require a far 
more detailed study than this article. As the 1996 Commission 
suggested, “[a]s an example, the addition of [appellate] divisions to the 
superior courts may require more full-time judges, law clerks, support 
personnel, office space, library materials, and equipment for those 
courts,”160 to highlight some of the logistical complexity. This article 
is merely an attempt to amplify the faint echo of the 1996 
Commission’s call to develop a plan to modernize Georgia’s courts—
“to have in place . . . a streamlined, modern, and efficient appellate 
court system in which jurisdictional division is clear and appellate 
courts are given the resources needed, on a continuing basis, to render 
                                                                                                                 
 158. District Courts of Appeal, FLA. COURTS, http://www.flcourts.org/florida-courts/district-court-
appeal.stml (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
 159. CHAMBLESS ET AL., supra note 5, at 6. 
 160. Id. at 5. 
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high quality and cost effective service to the people of Georgia.”161 For 
now, the authors believe that the Georgia legislature should: 
 
1. Increase the size of the Court of Appeals to fifteen judges and also 
provide sufficient funding necessary to maintain appropriate 
central staffing; 
2. Convert the Supreme Court into a true certiorari court by providing 
the Georgia Court of Appeals with direct appellate jurisdiction 
over (1) cases involving title to land; (2) all equity cases; (3) all 
cases involving wills; (4) all habeas corpus cases; (5) all cases 
involving extraordinary remedies; (6) all divorce and alimony 
cases; and (7) all cases in which the death penalty is or could have 
been imposed; 
3. Amend O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(g) to give the Court of Appeals the 
flexibility to utilize current and former superior court judges to sit 
by designation as the court deems appropriate upon further 
consideration; and 
4. Amend O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(c) to abolish the automatic seven-judge 
panel rule to relieve an unnecessary workload burden on the Court 
of Appeals. 
   
                                                                                                                 
 161. Id. at 6. 
39
Wallace et al.: Division of Labor
Published by Reading Room, 2014
964 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
 
 
40
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss4/2
